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ABSTRACT
This Article describes the transformations underwent by the corporate form from its
Roman origins to the present. It shows that every time there was a shift in the role of
the corporation, three theories of the corporation (the aggregate, artificial, and real
entity theories) were brought forward in cyclical fashion. However, every time the
real entity theory prevailed, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability in
the relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state. The article
describes this evolution in detail, and then attempts to derive normative consequences
for the legitimacy of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The basic argument is that
under the real view, which is historically the dominant view of the corporation, CSR
is normatively acceptable even when it does not contribute to the long-run welfare of
the shareholders.
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I.

Introduction

In June, 2001, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addressed the United
States Chamber of Commerce with an impassioned plea for business to “take
concerted action against the unparalleled nightmare of AIDS”.2 After discussing the
dimensions of the global AIDS crisis, the Secretary General went on to argue that
business leaders should get involved in the campaign to stop the spread of AIDS
“because AIDS affects business… the business community needs to get involved to
protect its bottom line… there is a happy convergence between what your
shareholders pay you for, and what is best for millions of people the world over.”3
The problem with thisappeal is that it is unlikely to be true for the majority of Mr.
Annan’s audience. It is hard to show that combating the AIDS crisis in Africa will
have any discernible impact on the bottom line for shareholders of an office
equipment manufacturer in Kalamazoo, Michigan. In fact, a recent review of the
literature on “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), the code name for all the various
ways for-profit enterprises can help their communities and the world, has shown that
it is very hard to demonstrate any significant positive correlation between CSR and
the “bottom line.”4
On the other hand, it is also clear that in many cases, corporations are in a better
position to help human development than either governments or non-for-profit
organizations. Corporations are typically smaller and more efficient than unwieldy
government bureaucracies, and in the developing world, are also less corrupt. And
corporations possess greater resources, both financial and technical, than most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Thus, an important question arises: Given that corporations are frequently in the best
position to help human development, should they be permitted to do so when there is
no clear benefit for their shareholders? This is a question that has been frequently
addressed by academics in the last half century, and overwhelmingly they have
answered in the negative. From Theodore Levitt’s classic 1958 article on “The
Dangers of Social Responsibility”5 to Milton Friedman’s influential NY Times
magazine article in 1970,6 to current writings by Michael Jensen and others,7 the
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consensus is that “the social responsibility if business is to increase its profits.” The
reasons given are first, that since management are deploying the shareholder’s
money, they should not be permitted to do so in ways that do not directly benefit the
shareholders;8 and second, that permitting more than one measure of managerial

Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-first Century, 51 Kansas L. Rev. 77 (2002);
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of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
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of History for Corporate Law, 89 Geo. L.J. 439, 441, 449-451 (2001) (shareholder primacy likely to
dominate future development of corporate law); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, the Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 12 (1991) (stating that shareholders, as residual claimants, have implicitly contracted
for promise that firm will maximize profits in long run); Henry G. Manne & Henry C. Wallich, The Modern
Corporation and Social Responsibility (1972) (noting that social responsibility of corporations is shareholder
wealth maximizing); Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996) (arguing that principal goal of corporate law is to maximize shareholder wealth);see
also Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram and James P. Walsh, The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 Law &
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Rev. 1021, 1023 (1996) ("[A]ll but the communitarians agree that virtually the sole task of corporate law is
to ensure that managers act as agents for the shareholder owners."); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable
Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. L.J. 1495 (1990) (discussing role of
stakeholders in firm). For arguments on the other side see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility in and Era of Economic Globalization, supra (it is debatable whether Hansmann and
Kraakman's statement about shareholders' control of the corporation is accurate in the United States. In
fact, one of the striking features of American corporate law is how little real control shareholders have,
given that they are the "owners" of the corporation); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 310 (1999) (where shareholders are widely
dispersed, shareholders' voting rights are practically meaningless, given collective action problems,
shareholders' rational apathy, and the power top managers exercise in nominating the candidates for the
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Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 579, 630-43 (1992) (arguing
that courts should modify corporate law to grant stakeholders standing to sue directors when the former are
harmed by corporate action); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 936-65 (1993) (arguing that
corporate law should be changed to encourage employee representation on the board and standing to sue);
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L.J. 201, 261-62 (praising case law that reaffirms
directors' discretion to consider nonshareholder interests). See generally Progressive Corporate Law
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (surveying recent nontraditional approaches to corporate legal
scholarship); Developments in the Law – Corporations and Society, Harvard Law Review, (2004), 2176 –
2177; Chen and Hanson, supra.
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success would enhance the agency cost problem and make it impossible to evaluate
managers with any reasonable degree of objectivity.9
And yet, the debate persists, because most managers in fact do want to engage (or at
least appear to engage) in CSR, arguing (in the face of the evidence) that this is in the
“long run” benefit of the shareholders.10 Moreover, they are permitted to do so by the
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, which state that “[e]ven if corporate profit
and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in the conduct of its
business…May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare,
humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.”11 This formulation represents
a compromise between the wishes of management for maximum freedom and the
consensus of corporate law academics.
This Article will attempt to shed a new light on this debate by putting it in historical
perspective. Historically, the corporation evolved from its origins in Roman law in a
series of four major transformations. First, the concept of the corporation as a
separate legal person from its owners or members had to be developed, and this
development was only completed with the work of the civil law Commentators in the
fourteenth century. By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation, i.e.,
a corporation with several members who chose others to succeed them, had legal
personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal
responsibility) and unlimited life, was well established in both civil and common law
jurisdictions. The next important step was the shift from non-profit membership
corporations to for-profit business corporations, which took place in England and the
U.S. in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The third
transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to corporations whose
shares are widely held and publicly traded, and with it the rise of limited liability and
freedom to incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth. Finally, the last major transformation was from
corporations doing business in one country to multinational enterprises whose
operations span the globe, which began after World War II and is still going on today.
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller, more temporary one which
occurred in the U.S. in the 1980s with the advent of hostile takeovers) was
accompanied by changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is
remarkable, however, is that throughout all these changes spanning two millennia, the
same three theories of the corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the
aggregate theory, which views the corporation as an aggregate of its members or
shareholders; the artificial entity theory, which views the corporation as a creature of
the State; and the real entity theory, which views the corporation as neither the sum of
9
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its owners nor an extension of the state, but as a separate entity controlled by its
managers.12
In this Article, we will describe the transformations underwent by the corporate form
from its Roman origins to the present. In addition, we will show that every time there
was a shift in the role of the corporation, all three theories were brought forward in
cyclical fashion. However, every time the real entity theory prevailed, for reasons we
will discuss below, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability in the
relationship between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state. We will describe
this evolution in detail, and then attempt to derive normative consequences for the
legitimacy of CSR. Our basic argument is that under the real view, which we will
argue is historically the dominant view of the corporation, CSR is normatively
acceptable even when it does not contribute to the long-run welfare of the
shareholders.
The Article is divided into three parts. After this Introduction, Part II describes the
evolution of the corporate form from Roman law to the present, and shows how in
each of the four transformations undergone by the corporation all three theories
tended to arise, but that the real theory ended up as the dominant one. Part III draws
the normative conclusions, and argues that if indeed the real theory is the dominant
theory of the corporation from a historical perspective, it provides a new way of
justifying CSR, even when it is does not benefit the shareholders and involves
problems for which the corporation is not responsible, like the AIDS crisis. In
addition, Part III puts the three theories of the corporation into a comparative
perspective, drawing on the “varieties of capitalism” literature, and argues that each
theory exemplifies one type of capitalist structure. This, in turn, explains the different
attitudes to CSR in different contemporary capitalist environments.
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II.

The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form

The corporation as a legal person separate from its owners is a uniquely Western
institution. Other legal systems, such as Muslim law, did not (before they were influenced
by the West) have a concept of legal personality separate from individual human beings.
The corporate form originated in Roman law in its classical period (the first two centuries
AD), was further developed in the Middle Ages in both canon (Church) and civil law,
and was adopted from civil law by the Anglo-American common law tradition.
In the West, the existence of the corporate form was crucial to the development of several
other important institutions, such as the university (whose very name derives from the
Latin term for corporation, universitas) and Parliament. It has in fact been argued that
other important Western developments such as the rise of representative democracy and
the scientific revolution can be tied to the corporate form.13
To get from the Roman origins of the corporate form to today’s multinational enterprises,
the corporation had to undergo several crucial changes. First, the concept of the
corporation as a separate legal person from its owners or members had to be developed,
and this development was only completed with the work of the civil law Commentators
in the fourteenth century. By the end of the Middle Ages, the membership corporation,
i.e., a corporation with several members who chose others to succeed them, had legal
personality (the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even bear criminal
responsibility) and unlimited life, was well established in both civil and common law
jurisdictions. The next important step was the shift from non-profit membership
corporations to for-profit business corporations, which took place in England and the
U.S. in the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The third
transformation was the shift from closely-held corporations to corporations whose shares
are widely held and publicly traded, and with it the rise of limited liability and freedom to
incorporate, which took place by the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth. Finally, the last major transformation was from corporations doing
business in one country to multinational enterprises whose operations span the globe,
which began after World War II and is still going on today.
Each of these four transformations (as well as a smaller, more temporary one which
occurred in the U.S. in the 1980s with the advent of hostile takeovers) was accompanied
by changes in the legal conception of the corporation. What is remarkable, however, is
that throughout all these changes spanning two millennia, the same three theories of the
corporation can be discerned. Those theories are the aggregate theory, which views the
corporation as an aggregate of its members or shareholders; the artificial entity theory,
which views the corporation as a creature of the State; and the real entity theory, which
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views the corporation as neither the sum of its owners nor an extension of the state, but as
a separate entity controlled by its managers.
In this Part , we will describe the transformations underwent by the corporate form from
its Roman origins to the present. In addition, we will show that every time there was a
shift in the role of the corporation, all three theories were brought forward in cyclical
fashion. However, every time the real entity theory prevailed, for reasons we will discuss
below, and it is the dominant theory during periods of stability in the relationship
between the corporation, the shareholders, and the state.
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1. First Transformation: The Establishment of the Corporation as a Legal Person.
Scholars have been debating for a long time whether classical Roman Law had in fact
developed a concept of the corporation as a legal person with legal attributes (owning
property, the capacity to sue and be sued) separate not just from its members as
individuals but also from its members as a group.14 The classical texts are in fact
ambiguous and reflect different views.15 But one can already discern in them the three
views of the corporation outlined above.
The artificial entity view, for example, is reflected in the following excerpt from the
classical jurist Gaius:
Partnerships, collegia, and bodies of this sort may not be formed by everybody at
will; for this right is restricted by statutes, senatus consulta, and imperial
constitutiones. In a few cases only are bodies of this sort permitted. For example,
partners in tax farming, gold mines, silver mines, and salt works are allowed to form
corporations. Likewise, there are certain collegia at Rome whose corporate status has
been established by senatus consulta and imperial constitutiones, for example, those
of the bakers and certain others and of the shipowners, who are found in the provinces
too. Those permitted to form a corporate body consisting of a collegium or
partnership or specifically one or the other of these have the right on the pattern of the
state to have common property, a common treasury, and an attorney or syndic
through whom, as in a state, what should be transacted and done in common is
transacted and done.16
The emphasis here is on the authority granted to the various types of corporation by the
state: without imperial permission, they could not have legal personality, own property, or
have an agent who can act in their name. In fact, we know from other sources that the
Roman emperors were suspicious of private corporations, especially in the provinces, as
potentially seditious, and refused permission to set up such corporations even for seemingly
innocuous purposes.17
The aggregate view of the corporation as equivalent to its members acting collectively is
reflected in the following excerpt from the classical jurist Paul:
14
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Citizens of a municipality can possess nothing of themselves, because the consent of all
is not possible. Hence, they do not possess the marketplace, public buildings, and the
like, but they use them in common. The younger Nerva, however, says that they can
both possess and usucapt through a slave what he has acquired through his peculium;
there are, however, those who think differently, since the citizens do not own the slaves
themselves.18
This refers to the Roman concept of possession (possessio), which requires animus and
corpus, the intention to possess and the capacity to hold19; Paul is saying that since the
members of a corporation cannot have a single animus, they cannot actually own anything.20
A similar aggregate view can also be discerned in the excerpt from Gaius cited above, where
he discusses the members acting collectively through an agent. The same view is also
reflected in the classical prohibition against instituting corporate bodies as heirs because
they are “uncertain”, i.e., their membership is changing.21
The real view, finally, is mostly reflected in the excerpts of the classical jurist Ulpian. For
example:
If members of a municipality or any corporate body appoint an attorney for legal
business, it should not be said that he is in the position of a man appointed by several
people; for he comes in on behalf of a public authority or corporate body, not on behalf
of individuals.22
Ulpian here uses “universitas” (corporate body) as equal to the “municipes” (members), and
speaks of the representative as acting for the corporate body rather than on behalf of the
“individuals”, which can be consistent with the aggregate view; but he also states that the
representative does not act for the “several people” , which favors the real entity view that
he acts for the corporation itself. Similarly, he states elsewhere that –
It has very frequently been written in rescripts that a slave belonging to a municipality
[may] be tortured in capital cases affecting the citizens because he is not their slave but
18
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D. 41.2.3.1; cf. W.W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law, rev. P. Stein (3rd ed., 1963), 199-202.
20
However, in another text he seems to imply that the agent can act for the collective: A legacy was left to
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on the other hand, believed that corporate bodies can be guilty of crimes that require intent. See D. 4. 2. 9. 1
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469 AD. See C. 6.24.8 (290 AD); C. 1.12.1 (321 AD); C. 6.24.12 (469 AD).
22
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the state’s, and the same should be said of other slaves belonging to corporate bodies;
for the slave appears to belong, not to a number of individuals, but to the body [itself].23
This text likewise reflects Ulpian’s real entity view of the corporation as separate not just
from the individual members but also from the “number of individuals” in aggregate. A
slave could not be tortured to give evidence against its master, but he could if the master was
a corporation.24
Finally, consider the following:
As regards decurions or other corporate bodies, it does not matter whether all the
members remain the same or only some or whether all have changed. But if a corporate
body is reduced to one member, it is usually conceded that he can sue and be sued, since
the rights of all have fallen to one and the corporate body continues to exist in name
only.25
In this text Ulpian envisages the corporate body as remaining unchanged as the membership
changes, and he even considers the possibility of a “corporation sole.” This is the clearest
evidence of the real entity view in the Roman texts; but note that not even Ulpian could
imagine a corporation continuing to exist without any members.
The same debate continued through the Middle Ages. Consider the following examples,
which come from the Ordinary Gloss by Franciscus Accursius (1182-1258), which was
written around 1250 and summarized the previous century’s work by the jurists in Bologna
of commenting on the Corpus Juris Civilis.
First, the artificial entity view:
Of others: Which are many: The congregation of any city, village or castle ... similarly
any congregation to uphold justice, such as the Tuscan scholars or the entire university
... similarly religious congregations ... And because certain societies are permitted, as the
text says, it is clear that normally they are prohibited ... But can a society, such as that of
scholars living in one inn, appoint an agent [to sue]? It seems they can, if the case is the
society's, as it is a permitted society.26
Here Accursius emphasizes the need for a society to get permission from the state to have
legal personality, just as Gaius did in the text he was commenting upon. The identity of the
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state has changed (the Bolognese jurists professed allegiance to the German emperors), as
did the identity of the corporations, but the concept is similar.
The aggregate view can be seen in Accursius’ definition of the agent as “Syndicus: Who
acts for any corporate body, but only for the many ... for he is called syndicus because he
argues (dicens) cases for the single ones (singulorum).”27 Here the agent is seen as speaking
for the members as a collective, as opposed to the members as individuals.28 Similarly,
Accursius rejected the concept of limited liability, requiring the members to be liable for
debts of the corporation, which again reflects the aggregate view.29 And he allows departing
members to take their share, although not of inheritances or other property that belonged to
the corporation itself.30
In yet other locations, the real entity view predominates, even when it requires challenging
the Roman authorities. For exampleThe people are called by trumpet or by bell or by voice, and even though they do not all
come, the majority of two thirds can consent ... Thus this law conceives they cannot all
will together easily ... But they can with difficulty.31
It is as if [Paul] said not easily, because they cannot will together easily ... but they can
with difficulty, so as when a bell is tolled, because all are considered to have done what
the council or a majority did ... and they can commit intimidation ... and obtain
possession ... and elect a tribune or leader ... for this question notes the rarity, not the
impossibility [of doing so].32

27

GO on D.3.4.1.1 (cited above), v. syndicum.
See also GO on C. 10.31.30, v. reipublicae: “And say that they all act through the agent or syndicus
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do not think so, because neither the grove nor any part thereof belong to anybody.” GO on D.3.4.7.1 v. non
debetur.
31
GO on D. 50.160.1 v. refertur, citing D. 41.2.1.22 (cited above).
32
GO on D. 4.3.15.1 v. facere possunt (cited above).
28
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Here Accursius rejects Paul’s view that corporate bodies cannot own anything because they
cannot will together, referring to the notion that the majority if the members can act for the
corporate body.33 Likewise,
What if a member of a corporate body injures you, can the corporate body be said to
have done it and be sued by you? It seems that not, because he did it out of his own will,
not as a corporate body, i.e., after deliberation and sounding a bell or having been
otherwise gathered together. On the contrary, yes, because a corporate body is nothing
more than the people who are there.34
This text clearly reflects the aggregate view. However, when Accursius considers the
question what happens when the membership changes, he seems to reject the aggregate view
in favor of the real entity view:
Some say that goods that belong to a college belong to the people, or to many single
individuals ... but they do not concede that if those [individuals] die the people is dead,
because others are considered (finguntur) to take their place. Thus the emitted cry
perishes, but not your voice. But what is argued to the contrary, that the goods do not
belong to single individuals, is true, as can be proven by the law against torturing
slaves.35
This text conceives of the membership corporation as unchanging even though the
individual members change. This could still be consistent with the aggregate view (the
membership remains as a collective), but the rejection of the view that the goods belong to
“many single individuals” and the citation to Ulpian suggest the real entity view.
Finally, consider the following:
Even though a single person cannot be a corporate body, he still retains the rights of the
corporate body, even though a single person cannot constitute a corporate body initially,
but only three persons ... But can he appoint a syndicus, who argues cases for the many,
or [at least] for two? It seems so ... But what if nobody at all remains, [asks] Johannes
[Bassianus]? The college is then dissolved, and the goods belong to nobody, like
inherited goods. But if thereafter by authority of the Pope or whoever is in charge of
33
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that college, someone is appointed to that college, by the artifice of the law the goods are
considered (fingitur) to belong to him ... Even though some Bishop Moses said that the
walls themselves possess even during the existence of the college, which seems very
difficult to say and contrary to the law. To the contrary, in no way do the goods belong
to anyone, but once the college has been dissolved, by the law they belong to the fisc or
the Pope. ... But it can be said for Moses, that the church is frequently called the place
itself which is surrounded by walls and consecrated; and it is also said that the church
can have rights and possess and sue ... thus the location itself, or the walls, possess even
while the college exists, through the priest, like a private person through an agent.36
In this gloss on Ulpian, Accursius goes beyond his Roman source to ask (following his
predecessor Johannes Bassianus) what happens if all members of a corporation die. He then
resorts to the artificial entity theory to argue that the state should appoint a replacement;
alternatively, he states that the college ceases to exist, consistent with the aggregate view.37
But he also mentions the possibility that the “location” of the corporation continues to exist,
which is closer to the real entity view. There is no resolution: all three views co-exist in this
text.
A hundred years later, however, the real entity view comes to predominate. This can be seen
in the following examples from the work of Bartolus of Sassoferato (1314-1357), the most
important of the Commentators, the generation that followed the Glossators in further
developing the interpretation of the Roman text. The work of Bartolus was influential well
into the nineteenth century, i.e., until the codification movement, which replaced the Corpus
Juris Civilis as the main source of civil law.38
Bartolus clearly adhered to the real entity view of the corporation. First, he rejected the
artificial entity view that permission by the state is needed to set up a corporation: “If some
people want to settle in some place, and create a city, castle, or village, they can do so, as it
is permitted by the law of nations.”39 This is understandable because by Bartolus’ time the
Holy Roman Empire had ceased to exist as a force in Italian political life and the Italian citystates were independent municipal corporations.40
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Second, Bartolus clearly envisaged the corporation remaining even if all of its members
perish: “What if this university [Perugia] were to perish by pestilence, and nobody
remained? ... The privileges would remain in the place where it was.”41 This commentary
was probably written after the Black Death of 1347-1348 swept through Europe, so it
reflects the reality of Bartolus’ time. But it also goes beyond Accursius and Ulpian to reject
the aggregate view.
Instead, Bartolus developed the concept of the corporation as persona representata, i.e., a
legal personality that is separate from both the state and its members, but that had to act
through agents. For example:
A corporate body is a legal name, and it does not have a soul or an intellect.
Therefore it cannot commit crimes ... Others say, that corporate bodies can commit
crimes ... We must consider first, whether a corporate body differs from its
members? Some say no, like the philosophers and canonists, who hold that the
whole does not really differ from its parts. The truth is, that if we speak about reality
proper, those say the truth. For a university of scholars is nothing other than the
scholars. But according to legal fiction they err. For a university represents a
person, which is different than the scholars, or its members ... Thus, if some scholars
leave and others return, nevertheless the university stays the same. Similarly if all
members of a people die and others take their place, the people is the same ... and
thus a corporate body is different from its members, by legal fiction, because it is a
represented person ... [Thus] a corporate body can commit crimes of omission,
because the corporate body itself omits, even though it is done by the negligence of
its rulers ... [Some crimes of commission] can be committed by corporate bodies,
nor can it be said that somebody private did it, but the corporate body itself ...
[murder and other acts of violence] cannot be committed by the corporate body
itself, for that requires a real person ... but they can be committed by its rulers ... but
it cannot be beheaded, as it has no real head, but only a fictive one.42
This text shows that Bartolus had a clear vision of the corporation as separate both from the
state and from its members. It was a “legal fiction” that could have the basic attributes of
legal personality, i.e., the capacity to own property, sue and be sued, and even commit
crimes, although in all these respects it had to act through its agents, and it was not subject to
certain kinds of punishment.43
What enabled Bartolus to go beyond his Roman and medieval sources to reach this
conclusion? In part, it was a natural evolution of moving away from and beyond the ancient
eliminated the last chance that the Empire would be restored to the position it held in the middle of the
twelfth century. See Dante Alighieri, Vita Nuova (1988).
41
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text through the process of commentary and debate, which can also be seen for example in
medieval commentary on Aristotle.44 Interestingly, it was the rise of universities that
enabled this unique process of comment and debate to take place in the West, and the rise of
universities in turn was premised on the availability of the corporate form.45
But Bartolus was also influenced by external factors, the most important of which were the
decline of the Holy Roman Empire, which led to the abandonment of artificial entity theory
that corporations needed imperial permission to exist, and the rise of independent
corporations in Italy such as the city state and the Italian universities. For these corporations
to maintain their independence, they needed to be seen as separate both from the state and
from their members, since even the collective membership could perish. Bartolus and his
colleagues did not want the privileges and property of the university to revert to the Popes or
the Emperors should the membership all change at once. Hence, the natural theory for
Bartolus to embrace as representative of the university was real entity theory, which enabled
the university to maintain its independence both from the state and from its members.46
We thus see that in the period between the classical Roman jurists in the second century AD
and the Commentators in the fourteenth century the concept of the corporation as a legal
person gradually evolved, and that as this evolution proceeded all three theories of the
corporation (aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity) were brought forward by various
legal commentators. We also see that in the end, aided by external factors such as the
decline of the state, real entity theory, which most closely reflects the views and interests of
corporate management, emerges as the dominant theory. As we shall see, this pattern of
debate among the three theories followed by the triumph of real entity theory is typical of
subsequent transformations in the role of the corporation as well.
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2.

Second Transformation: From Non-Profit to For-Profit Corporations.

The period between Bartolus (mid 14th century) and the late 18th century was one of
relative stability in the development of the corporate form. The corporation was
established as a membership corporation, i.e., a corporation made up of members who
selected their own successors, like the President and Fellows of Harvard College still do
today. As such, a corporation had legal personality, i.e., the rights to own property, sue
and be sued, act under a common seal, and other such “chestnuts.”47 Private corporations
were used primarily for non-profit purposes (e.g., hospitals and universities), but by the
18th century there were also some commercial ones (e.g., the East India Company).48
From our perspective, there were two significant developments in this period. The first
was the reassertion of royal control over corporations; in England and other European
countries corporations could only be established by royal charter. Blackstone notes that
although in Roman law corporations could be established without “the prince’s consent”,
“with us in England, the king’s consent is absolutely necessary.”49 Second, some degree
of outside control over management was established through the institution of the
committee of visitors, which represented the interests of the founder and of the wider
community.50
But other than in extraordinary cases, the real entity view of the corporation prevailed
throughout this period and management (the members) were firmly in control. “A
corporation aggregate of many is invisible, immortal, and rests only in intendment and
consideration of the law.”51 As such, it was a self-perpetuating body subject to relatively
little outside regulation. Corporations, Blackstone notes, are “artificial persons, who may
maintain a perpetual succession, and enjoy a kind of legal immortality.”52 When the
members “are consolidated and united into a corporation, they and their successors are
then considered as one person in law: as one person, they have one will, which is
collected from the sense of the majority of the individuals… for all the individual
members that have existed from the foundation to the present time, or that shall ever
hereafter exist, are but one person in law, a person that never dies.”53 This one person
then acquires all the rights of corporations, including perpetual succession, the right to
sue and be sued, the right to own property, to have a common seal, to make by-laws, and
to be subject to certain criminal liabilities.54 The king constituted corporations, and the
king or other visitors exercised some degree of supervision over them, but once
established, the corporation (i.e., its members) remained subject to relatively little outside
regulation.
47
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This situation meant that corporate status was very desirable, especially since the
members also enjoyed limited liability for corporate debts.55 But the English Kings were
very cautious with granting corporate charters, especially in the case of for-profit
enterprises; only corporations that were clearly vested with a public purpose and
benefited the public fisc, like the East India and Hudson Bay Companies, received royal
approval, and accumulated vast power. As more capital was required for commercial
enterprises this resulted in promoters organizing corporations with transferable shares and
claimed that under authority of a lost or obsolete charter the shareholders enjoyed limited
liability. After the South Sea Bubble burst in 1720, this problem led to the Bubble Act,
under which it became a crime to organize such corporations without explicit royal
consent.56 Although prosecutions under the Bubble Act were rare, it meant that the entire
Industrial Revolution in England (1760-1820) took place outside the corporate form and
without limited liability.57 The Bubble Act was ultimately repealed in 1825, after the
Industrial Revolution was over, but with the provision of unlimited liability for
shareholders, which continued to be the rule in England until 1855.58
This situation, which can be seen as a way of maintaining state control over corporations
through restrictions on charters, meant that the next great shift in the use of corporate
form took place in the fledgling United States. There, once the revolution was over, every
state could issue corporate charters. The result was an explosion of charters for
commercial enterprises. One of the first treatises written on corporate law was Joseph
Angell and Samuel Ames’ Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate,
published in Boston in 1832.59 Angell and Ames begin their book by stating thatThe reader does not require to be told, that we have in our country an infinite
number of corporations aggregate, which have no concern whatever with affairs
of a municipal nature. These associations we not only find scattered throughout
every cultivated part of the United States, but so engaged are they in all the
varieties of useful pursuit, that we see them directing the concentration of mind
and capital to…the encouragement and extension of the great interests of
commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing. There is a great difference in this
respect between our own country, and the country from which we have derived a
great portion of our laws. What is done in England by combination, unless it be
the management of municipal concerns, is most generally done by a combination
of individuals, established by mere articles of agreement. On the other hand, what
55
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is done here by the co-operation of several persons is, in the greater number of
instances, the result of a consolidation effected by an express act or charter of
incorporation.60
The main reason for this proliferation of corporations in the United States was the second
great transformation in the role of the corporation in society: from primarily a non-forprofit to primarily a for-profit enterprise. As Judge Kent stated, “the multiplication of
corporations in the United States, and the avidity with which they are sought, have arisen
in consequence of the power which a large and consolidated capital gives them over
business of every kind; and the facility which the incorporation gives to the management
of capital, and the security which it affords to the persons of its members, and to their
property not vested in the corporate stock.”61
This was a profound shift, and not surprisingly it led to a revival of the centuries- old
debate about the nature of the corporate form and its relationship to the shareholders and
to the state. This debate can be seen if we examine the opinions on the subject issued by
the first great American jurist, John Marshall. Three of Marshall’s opinions, written
decades apart, are particularly relevant here: Bank of the United States v. Deveaux (1809),
Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), and Bank of the United States v. Dandridge
(1827).62 These opinions represent the evolution of his thinking on corporations, which
moved from the aggregate view (Deveaux) to the artificial entity view (Dartmouth
College) to the real entity view (Dandridge).
Deveaux involved an attempt by the state of Georgia to tax the Savannah branch of the
Bank of the United States, a corporation established by Congress in 1791, as part of the
early struggles around federalism. The Bank was a membership corporation (“The
President, Directors and Company of the Bank of the United States”) and all the members
were citizens of Pennsylvania. The Bank refused to pay the tax and the State sent its
collectors to enforce payment, whereupon the Bank sued the collectors in federal court,
claiming diversity jurisdiction. The issue facing the court was whether a corporation
made up of members from one state could sue citizens of another state in federal court on
diversity grounds. This in turn required deciding between the view that “the individual
character of the members is so wholly lost in that of the corporation, that the court cannot
take notice of it”, and the contrary view that “a corporation is composed of natural
persons”, i.e., between the entity (artificial or real) and aggregate views.63
Marshall decided in favor of the aggregate view. He stated that the corporation itself,
“that mere legal entity”, cannot be a citizen or sue in federal court, unless it can be
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regarded as “a company of individuals”.64 However, since the reasons that led Congress
to enact diversity jurisdiction applied to corporations as well, Marshall was inclined to
see the controversy as being between the members “suing in their corporate character”
and their opponents.65 “The controversy is substantially between aliens, suing by a
corporate name, and a citizen…in this case the corporate name represents persons who
are members of the corporation.”66 The Court therefore held that federal jurisdiction
existed.
Ten years later Marshall was faced with another difficult issue involving corporations. In
the famous Dartmouth College case, the state of New Hampshire attempted to alter the
charter of Dartmouth College (incorporated as a membership corporation by George III in
1769, under the name of Trustees of Dartmouth College), by transferring the appointment
of trustees to the state, thereby effectively taking it over. The trustees objected, arguing
that the charter constituted a contract and altering it violated the contracts clause of the
Constitution.67
Marshall held that as the College was a private corporation, its charter was a contract and
was protected by the contracts clause. He began by noting that the funds for the College
came from private sources and its educational character did not make it public either. He
then got to the heart of the question- whether the act of incorporation by the state makes
it possible for the state to take it over. In frequently quoted language, Marshall held thatA corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence.68
This language reflects the artificial entity view of the corporation. But Marshall then went
on to note that, having created the corporation, the state may not treat it as a mere
extension of itself: “this being does not share in the civil government of the country,
unless that be the purpose for which it was created.”69 Even though its object is to
promote governmentally approved aims, this does not make corporations into mere
instruments of government. Instead, the corporation exists to represent the interest of the
founder and his descendants in the aims for which it was founded. This interest is in the
United States protected by the contracts clause, although in England, Marshall
recognized, Parliament had the power to annul the charter.70 In this country “the body
corporate, as possessing the whole legal and equitable interest, and completely
representing the donors, for the purpose of executing the trust, has rights which are
protected by the constitution.”71
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It should be noted that while Marshall held that the state may not take over a private
corporation, even one founded for public ends, the emphasis on the artificial nature of the
corporation left ample room for state regulation via the original charter. Since states were
busy granting charters by the hundreds, the Dartmouth opinion left ample room for the
states to regulate corporations, should they wish to do so.
Finally, six years later, Marshall was once more called to opine on the nature of
corporations in another case involving the Bank of the United States.72 The case involved
a suit by the Bank on a bond executed by Dandridge, one of its cashiers, in which the
defendant argued that the bond had never been approved by the Board of Directors, as
required by the charter of incorporation. The key issue was whether the level of evidence
required of corporations was higher than that required of individuals, since corporations
are incapable of acting not in writing. Justice Story for the Court held that no distinction
should be made: “The same presumptions are…applicable to corporations.”73 Marshall,
however, dissented. He argued that—
The corporation being one entire impersonal entity, distinct from the individuals
who compose it, must be endowed with a mode of action peculiar to itself, which
will always distinguish its transactions from those of its members. This faculty
must be exercised according to its own nature…This can be done only in
writing.74
The Court’s view was the more pragmatic one, but Marshall’s view was more consistent
with the real entity view of the corporation as distinct from its members, individually or
collectively. It certainly forms an interesting contrast with the views he expressed in the
Deveaux case sixteen years earlier.
How can one explain the shift in Marshall’s view of the corporation from aggregate
(Deveaux) to artificial (Dartmouth College) to real (Dandridge)? In part, this stems from
the circumstances of these particular cases. In Deveaux, Marshall wanted to confer
diversity jurisdiction to protect a federal institution (he was after all a Federalist), and the
only way to do so was to look through the corporation to its members. In Dartmouth
College, the issue involved the relationship of private corporations (albeit “imbued with a
public purpose”; the full fledged private/public distinction had not yet evolved) to the
state, and thus Marshall emphasized the role of the state in creating the corporation, while
placing clear limits on its ability to regulate corporations thereafter. These limits were
required as the result of the proliferation of corporations, especially for- profit business
corporations, since otherwise the state would be able to take over purely private
businesses. The result in Dartmouth College favored in practice the real entity view,
since once a private corporation was created, it could no longer be taken over or perhaps
even be overly regulated by the state. Thus, it may not be surprising that by the time he
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came to write his Dandridge dissent Marshall took the real entity view, even though it
contradicted his opinion in Deveaux (which is not mentioned).
Two important legal developments during the same period strengthened the real entity
view and weakened the aggregate and artificial entity views of the corporation: the rise of
limited liability and the spread of general incorporation laws. Limited liability weakened
the aggregate view, and general incorporation weakened the artificial entity view.
First, limited liability: As we have seen, in England limited liability did not exist for
corporations until 1855. In the United States, however, most states adopted limited
liability in the 1830s.75 In their second edition, Angell & Ames explain that this was the
primary distinction between a partnership and a corporation:
In every private unincorporated company, the members are liable for the debts
without limitation, whereas in incorporated societies, they are only liable to the
extent of their shares…It is frequently the principal object, in this and in other
countries, in procuring an act of incorporation, to limit the risk of the partners to
their shares in the stock of the association; and prudent men are always backward
in taking stock when they become mere copartners as regards their personal
liability for the company debts.76
When Angell & Ames wrote this limited liability was by no means a universally
established rule for corporations77; they were thus trying to establish the law as much as
describing the law that existed. Their main argument, familiar from current debates on
limited liability78, was that “[t]he public, therefore, gain by acts incorporating trading
associations, as by such means persons are induced to hazard a certain amount of
property for the purposes of trade and public improvement, who would abstain from
doing so, were not their liability limited.”79
Eventually this argument won the day, and by 1840 most of the states established limited
liability.80 Limited liability, in turn, led to a decline in the emphasis on the aggregate
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theory, because the aggregate view of corporations tend to reduce the distinction between
the corporation and its members or shareholders that is at the heart of limited liability.
The decline of the aggregate view can clearly be seen in two cases from the period 18391844, in which the Supreme Court repudiated Marshall’s opinion in Deveaux. In Bank of
Augusta v. Earle the Court held that a corporation incorporated by Georgia may execute a
valid contract in Alabama on comity grounds, but it rejected the argument that Alabama
was required to accept the contract on the basis of the privileges and immunities clause
applied directly to the corporation’s members (as required by the aggregate view), stating
that Deveaux has never been extended that far. Chief Justice Taney emphasized that he
rejected the aggregate view because of its implications for limited liability, as well as its
implications for state regulation of the corporations operating in it:
The result of this [aggregate view] would be to make the corporation a mere
partnership in business, in which each stockholder would be liable to the whole
extent of his property for the debts of the corporation…Besides, it would deprive
every state of all control over the extent of corporate franchises proper to be
granted in the state.81
In Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, decided in 1844, the
Court explicitly limited Deveaux to its facts, holding that diversity jurisdiction may arise
even when some of the members of a defendant corporation are citizens of the same state
as the plaintiff.82 The Court stated that the Deveaux results “have never been satisfactory
to the bar” and that a corporation “seems to us to be a person, although an artificial one,
inhabiting and belonging to that state [of incorporation], and therefore entitled, for
purposes of suing and being sued, to be deemed a citizen of that state.”83
This result was required by the proliferation of business corporations having many
shareholders in many states, as opposed to the membership corporations of Marshall’s
early days. As Angell & Ames stated, by 1832 “Joint stock companies are composed of
persons who seldom know any thing of the business of the company, but who leave the
management of it entirely to the board of directors, and are contented with receiving such
periodical dividends as the directors think proper to make.”84 The separation of
management from ownership, and the rise of limited liability, rendered the aggregate
view implausible.85
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1824).
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Second, general incorporation: The granting of corporate charters by state legislatures
became in the 1820s and 1830s a process fraught with corruption.86 Some Jacksonians
reacted by advocating elimination of the rights of states to grant corporate charters. But
the corporate form was so widely used that this was impracticable; instead, laws were
passed in all the states permitting anyone to form a corporation on payment of a fee,
without permission by the state legislature.87 This democratizing move meant that the
artificial entity theory, under which the corporation derives its powers from the state, lost
most of its appeal, since the state was only vestigially involved in creating corporations.
Instead, corporations were viewed as separate from both their shareholders and the state,
and the real entity view reigned supreme.88

corporations, and by a usage, so general and uniform as to be regarded as part of the law of the land, they
have the general superintendence and active management of all the concerns of the bank, and constitute, for
purposes of dealing with others, the corporation” (emphasis added). It is hard to imagine a clearer rejection
of the aggregate view. Similarly, in Hoyt v. Thompson’s Executor, decided by the New York Court of
Appeals in 1859, the court held that “[i]n corporate bodies the powers of the board of directors are, in a
very important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they revoke those
powers. They are derivative only in the sense of being received from the State in the act of incorporation.
The directors convened as a board are the primary possessors of all the powers which the charter confers,
and like private principals they may delegate to agents of their own appointment the performance of any
acts which they themselves can perform. The recognition of this principle is absolutely necessary in the
affairs of every corporation whose powers are vested in a board of directors. Without it the most ordinary
business could not be carried on, and the corporate powers could not be executed.” 19 N.Y. 207, 216
(1859). This constitutes a recognition that the aggregate view deriving from the membership corporation
could not be maintained as a practical matter in corporations with hundreds or thousands of shareholders, as
already existed in the 1850s.
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3.

Third Transformation: From Closely-Held to Widely-Held Corporations.

The situation between the 1820s and the end of the Civil War was thus the proliferation
of for profit corporations, incorporated under general incorporation laws with minimal
interference by the state, and whose shareholders enjoyed limited liability. Those
shareholders were, however, relatively limited in number; despite the Angell & Ames
quotation above, few corporations before 1865 required massive amounts of capital, and
most were small, closely heldenterprises. T his enabled the Civil War income tax to be
imposed directly on the shareholders of corporations.89
This state of affairs began to change with the advent of the railroads, followed by the
steel and oil companies. With the rise of large corporate enterprises, massive amounts of
capital were required, and between 1865 and the 1890s the widely held, publicly traded,
non-owner managed enterprise gradually became the norm for U.S. business activities.
This was followed from 1890 to 1906 by a wave of consolidation that left several
important business areas dominated by monopolies run by the “robber barons.”
The shift from small, closely held enterprises to massive, publicly held ones once again
necessitated a re-examination of the corporate form, and again all three theories of the
corporation appear. A classic example of the aggregate view is the Santa Clara case,
ultimately decided by the Supreme Court in 1886. This case is famous for Chief Justice
Waite’s statement that “The court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the [equal protection clause] applies to these corporations. We are all of the
opinion that it does.”90 Some scholars identified this as an application of the real entity
view to corporations, but Prof. Horwitz has shown by examining Justice Field’s opinion
in the court below that it actually represented an application of the aggregate view.
Specifically, Field held that the equal protection clause must apply to corporations for the
following reasons:
Private corporations consist of an association of individuals united for some
lawful purpose, and permitted to use a common name in their business and have
succession of membership without dissolution…But these members do not,
because of such association, lose their right to protection, and equality of
protection…Whatever affects the property of the corporation- that is, of all the
members united by the common name- necessarily affects their interests…So,
therefore, whenever a provision of the constitution or of a law guarantees to
persons protection in their property… the benefits of the provision are extended to
corporations; not to the name under which different persons are united, but to the
individuals composing the union. The courts will always look through the name to
see and protect those whom the name represents [citing Deveaux.]91
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A clearer statement of the aggregate view can hardly be imagined; most remarkable is
Field’s reliance on Deveaux despite the fact that the Supreme Court overturned its results
forty years earlier. Similarly, in Pembina Consolidated Co. v. Pennsylvania, decided two
years later, Justice Field for the Court stated that “Under the designation of person there
is no doubt that a private corporation is included. Such corporations are merely
associations of individuals united for a special purpose.”92
However, the artificial entity view was also raised in these cases. In Santa Clara, the
railroad corporations made the argument that because they were operating under special
congressional legislation they should be regarded as an extension of the federal
government and therefore California could not tax them.93 Field rejected this view (citing
Dartmouth College), but noted that “when the instrumentality is the creation of the statea corporation formed under its laws-and is employed or adopted by the general
government for its convenience…it remains subject to the taxing power of the state.”94
And notably, in Pembina Field followed Taney in rejecting the argument that the
privileges and immunities clause applied to corporations because they were not
“citizens”, even though the aggregate view he adopted in Santa Clara might have led to
the contrary position. Instead, Field emphasized the relationship between the corporation
and the incorporating state under the artificial entity view:
The term citizens, as used in this clause, applies only to natural persons, members
of the body politic owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial persons created
by the legislature, and possessing only such attributes as the legislature has
prescribed…a grant of corporate existence was a grant of special privileges to the
corporators, enabling them to act for certain specified purposes as a single
individual, and exempting them, unless otherwise provided, from individual
liability.95
Moreover, all three views of the corporation appear in Hale v. Henkel, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1906. The issues were whether an agent of a corporation could invoke
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure in the name of the corporation. On the
Fifth Amendment issue, the Court held that the right against self-incrimination does not
apply to corporations:
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate himself
is purely a personal privilege of the witness…The question whether a corporation
is a “person” within the meaning of this Amendment really does not arise…since
it can only be heard by oral evidence in the person of some one of its agents or
employees.96
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This is closest to the real entity view, since it rejects (like Marshall in Dandridge) the
aggregate position of looking through a corporation to its shareholders, and takes into
account the special characteristics of the corporation itself.
On the other hand, on the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court at first emphasized the
artificial entity view, using it to justify regulation by the state:
Conceding that the witness was an officer of the corporation under investigation,
and that he was entitled to assert the rights of the corporation with respect to the
production of its books and papers, we are of the opinion that there is a clear
distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at
the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a
citizen…Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the State. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the State
and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no
contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved
right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has
exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a State, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in the exercise
of its sovereignty inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether
they had been abused, and demand the production of the corporate books and
papers for that purpose…While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer
incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not
follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may
refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.97
However, having clearly stated its reasons for limiting the application of the
constitutional right, the Court suddenly reverts to the aggregate view when facing the
question whether corporations have any Fourth Amendment rights at all:
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[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to
immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an
assumed name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective
body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded against
by due process of law, and is protected, under the Fourteenth Amendment, against
unlawful discrimination. Corporations are a necessary feature of modern business
activity, and their aggregated capital has become the source of nearly all great
enterprises.98
What can explain this remarkable oscillation between the three views? The key is the last
sentence quoted. As noted above, the period between 1890 and 1916 marked the height of
the debate on the rise of the great corporations. The Court is trying to strike a balance
between the rights of the corporations, which can best be protected under either the
aggregate or the real entity views, and the regulatory power of the state, which is best
reflected in the artificial entity view. On the one hand, as the Court states, “[c]orporations
are a necessary feature of modern business activity” and must be protected. On the other
hand, the right of the state to regulate must also be preserved, especially since the context
of Hale v. Henkel was an antitrust investigation into two major corporations, the
American Tobacco Company and McAndrews & Forbes Inc.
Ultimately, however, the real entity view prevailed.99 This involved first the rejection of
the aggregate view. For example, in Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, decided just
one year after Hale v. Henkel, Justice Harlan emphasized that a corporation is a separate
entity from its shareholders, and therefore is not a “citizen” for purposes of the privileges
and immunities clause or entitled to the protection of the due process clause: “the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due process of law
is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.”100 But by itself this position would have
led to too much state regulation for the Lochner court. Thus, in Southern Railway Co. v.
Greene, decided in 1909, the Court came out clearly for the position that the corporation
as such was entitled to constitutional protection under the equal protection clause,
without any reference to its shareholders: “the corporation…is within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a person within the jurisdiction of the state of Alabama, and
entitled to be protected against any statute of the State which deprives it of the equal
protection of the laws.”101
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Once again, the triumph of the real entity view can be explained by several factors. The
aggregate view was raised by Field and others to protect the rights of corporations, but it
was even more incongruous in the context of the mega-corporations of the 1890s, with
thousands of shareholders, than in the pre-civil days. It also gave the corporation too
many rights vis-a-vis the state, as seen in Hale v. Henkeland in Greenberg. The artificial
entity view gave the state too much power to regulate corporations, as the Hale v. Henkel
court came to realize when it laid out its implications. The real entity view was the most
congruent with business realities as well as the one most suited to some balance between
corporations and the state. By 1909, it was well established as the dominant view of the
corporation, as reflected in contemporary debates surrounding the enactment of the
corporate tax.102
The rise of the real entity view is also reflected in two other contemporary developments:
the rise of the business judgment rule, and the decline of the ultra vires doctrine.103 The
business judgment rule rejected the aggregate view in holding that the board of directors
held powers that were not delegated from the shareholders and that shareholders could
not normally call into question the exercise of those powers. Theultra vires doctrine
represented the ability of the state to require corporations to adhere to their charter, and
was thus based on the artificial entity view; its decline thus reinforced the rejection of
that view.
The first full statement of the business judgment rule was made in Leslie v. Lorillard,
decided by the New York Court of appeals in 1888. The court held thatIn actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or trustees,
courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or
unconscientiously executed…Mere errors of judgment are not sufficient as
grounds for equity interference; for the powers entrusted with corporate
management are largely discretionary.104
Union Tel. Co., 216 US 146, 157 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 US 56, 64 (1910); Western Union
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Augusta v. Earl. See Horwitz, supra.
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A year later the same court expanded this statement, holding thatAll powers directly conferred by statute, or impliedly granted, of necessity, must
be exercised by the directors who are constituted by the law as the agency for the
doing of corporate acts. The expression of the corporate will and the performance
of corporate functions in the management of a corporation, may originate with its
directors…Within the chartered authority they have the fullest power to regulate
the concerns of a corporation, according to their best judgment…In the
management of the affairs of the corporation, they are dependent solely upon their
own knowledge of its business and their own judgment as to what its interests
require.105
This rule became well established, so that by 1905 a court could write that “it is [the
board’s] judgment, and not that of its stockholders outside of the board of directors, that
is to shape [a corporation’s] policies or decide upon its corporate acts. This principle is
not disputed, and the citation of authorities in its support is unnecessary.”106 The rule
reflected the real entity view, which equates the corporation with its management, and
rejected the aggregate view of the corporation as an aggregate of its shareholders.107
The one potential limitation on the power of the board was the ultra vires doctrine, which
held that a board could not act contrary to the powers conferred on it by the state. The
ultra vires doctrine thus represented the artificial entity view. The doctrine originated in
the pre- civil war era,108 but became prominent in the arguments on the relationship of the
state and the corporation in the 1880s and 1890s.109 The artificial entity argument for
upholding the limitation was stated clearly by the New York Court of Appeals in 1888In the granting of charters the legislature is presumed to have had in view the
public interest; and public policy is (as the interests of stockholders ought to be)
concerned in the restriction of corporations within chartered limits, and a
departure therefrom is only deemed excusable when it cannot result in prejudice
to the public or to the shareholders. As artificial creations, they have no powers or
faculties, except those with which they were endowed when
created…Corporations are great engines for the promotion of the public
convenience, and for the development of public wealth, and, so long as they are
conducted for the purposes for which organized, they are a public benefit; but if
allowed to engage, without supervision, in subjects of enterprise foreign to their
charters, or if permitted unrestrainedly to control and monopolize the avenues to
105
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that industry in which they are engaged, they become a public menace, against
which public policy and statutes design protection.110
The doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in the following year. Referring to the
artificial entity doctrine, the Court stated that -It may be considered as the established doctrine of this court in regard to the
powers of corporations, that they are such and such only as are conferred upon
them by the acts of the legislatures of the several States under which they are
organized. A corporation in this country, whatever it may have been in England
at a time when the crown exercised the right of creating such bodies, can only
have an existence under the express law of the State or sovereignty by which it is
created. And these powers, where they do not relate to municipal corporations
exercising authority conferred solely for the benefit of the public, and in some
sense parts of the body politic of the State, have in this country until within recent
years always been conferred by special acts of the legislative body under which
they claim to exist. But the rapid growth of corporations, which have come to
take a part in all or nearly all of the business operations of the country, and
especially in enterprises requiring large aggregations of capital and individual
energy, as well as their success in meeting the needs of a vast number of most
important commercial relations, have demanded the serious attention and
consideration of law makers. And while valuable services have been rendered to
the public by this class of organizations, which have stimulated their formation by
numerous special acts, it came at last to be perceived that they were attended by
many evils in their operation as well as much good, and that the hasty manner in
which they were created by the legislatures, sometimes with exclusive privileges,
often without due consideration and under the influence of improper motives,
frequently led to bad results.111

The reference to corporate abuses relates to the rise of trusts, and indeed the ultra vires
doctrine was used to dissolve sugar and oil trusts under New York and Ohio law.112
However, in 1895 the Supreme Court rejected an antitrust challenge to the sugar trust on
the grounds that the Sherman Act applied only to corporations engaged directly in
interstate commerce.113 And in 1896 the Court rejected an ultra vires challenge to the
ability of the Union Pacific Railway to lease its tracks for 999 years to another railroad,
when the charter would not permit an outright sale.114 This literal decision significantly
reduced the power of the ultra vires doctrine.115
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The ultimate demise of the doctrine resulted not from a court decision but from the
competition among states to attract corporate charters, which was begun by New Jersey
in 1890 and continued by Delaware in the 1900s.116 This competition meant that New
Jersey and Delaware had every incentive to relax any limiting elements in their charters
that restricted the power of corporate management.117 Thus, for example, the long-lasting
prohibition against corporations owning stock in other corporations, which led to the
necessity of “trusts”, was eliminated by New Jersey in its 1890 law.118 As a result,
although the Supreme Court still held in 1899 that such a combination was ultra vires
under New York law, this holding became rather meaningless since most corporations
were incorporated in New Jersey.119 As the New Jersey statute explains:
It was formerly the rule in this State that acts of a corporation in excess of its
express powers, or those necessarily implied, were void, and contracts which were
ultra vires the corporation were incapable of enforcement or ratification…This
rule no longer obtains.120
The decline of the ultra vires doctrine was sealed by the spread of corporate laws
permitting incorporation “for any lawful purpose”. With the doctrine gone, the artificial
entity view of the corporation became less plausible, and the real entity view reigned
supreme again.121
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4.

A Failed Transformation: The Hostile Takeover Crisis.

In 1926 John Dewey published an article in the Yale Law Journal in which he dismissed
as irrelevant the debate among the aggregate, artificial entity, and real entity views of the
corporation. These views, he explained, could be deployed to suit any purpose; and he
used examples relying on the cyclical nature if these theories. His conclusion was that
theory should be abandoned for an examination of reality.122
Dewey was influential in that the theoretical debate on corporate personality largely
disappeared until the 1970s. As a practical matter, however, the real entity view
predominated for large, publicly traded corporations. The board ran the corporation as it
saw fit, protected from the shareholders by the separation of ownership from
management noted by Berle & Means in the 1930s, and by the business judgment rule,
and protected from the state by the relaxation of corporate law limits begun by New
Jersey and continued by Delaware.
The next significant practical change in this state of affairs only arose in the 1980s. As a
result of the invention of the junk bond market, it suddenly became possible for hostile
raiders to threaten takeovers of even the largest corporations. After RJR Nabisco was
taken private for $25 billion in 1988, it was clear that no board was safe. As a result,
debates on the nature of the corporation and its relationship to the shareholders and the
state, which began in the academic literature in the 1970s, once again became a matter of
practical concern. And once again all three theories of the corporation reappeared, as can
be seen if one examines three seminal cases decided between 1982 and 1989 by the
Supreme Courts of the United States and of Delaware.
Edgar v. MITE Corp., decided by the Supreme Court in 1982, involved the
constitutionality of an anti-takeover act enacted by the state of Illinois.123 Under the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act, a hostile tender offer for the shares of a company
covered by the act had to be registered by the Secretary of State and the offeror had to
give both the target and the state a 20 day notice during which only the target could
communicate with its shareholders regarding the offer. The act applied both to
corporations 10% of whose shareholders were resident of Illinois and to corporations that
were either incorporated in the state or had their principal office in it. The MITE
corporation made a hostile offer for an Illinois corporation and refused to comply with
the act, arguing that it violated the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court agreed with MITE. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice White held
that the Illinois act was unconstitutional because it could apply to tender offers that did
not affect a single Illinois shareholder; “the state has no legitimate interest in protecting
nonresident shareholders.”124 Moreover, the fact that the target corporation was an
Illinois corporation was irrelevant since state regulation only applied to the corporation’s
“internal affairs”: “Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third
122
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party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company.”125
Instead, the focus should be entirely on the impact of blocking the tender offer on the
company’s shareholders and their relationship with management:
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender
offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their highest
valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered.
The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to
perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced. See Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender
Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1173-1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash
Tender Offers, 57 Texas L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373,
p. 12 (1976).
This part of the opinion clearly reflects the aggregate view: The focus is entirely on the
impact on the corporation’s shareholders, and the corporation itself (including its
management) barely exist, as indicated by the statement that a change in corporate
control has no relevance to the internal affairs of the corporation. The market for
corporate control is praised because of its ability to overcome the agency cost problem
and the incentive it provides for management to maximize stock prices. Moreover, White
quotes the work of Easterbrook and Fischel, who are among the principal proponents of
the “nexus of contracts” theory of the corporation, according to which the corporation is
merely a convenient legal term for a series of contracts, the most important of which is
the contract between shareholders and management.126
This part of the opinion, which rejects both the artificial entity and the real entity
theories, evoked some misgivings on the part of Justice Powell, even though he joined it
to provide the crucial fifth vote. Powell noted that in some cases the state may have a
legitimate interest because the corporation has a real presence that goes beyond a contract
between management and the shareholders, reflecting both the artificial and real entity
views:
I join Part V-B because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for
state regulation of tender offers. This period in our history is marked by
conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws.
Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional personnel
experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that vastly exceed those of the
takeover target. This disparity in resources may seriously disadvantage a
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relatively small or regional target corporation. Inevitably there are certain adverse
consequences in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are
moved away from a city and State.*
* The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations
tend to be located in the large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these metropolitan centers, the
State and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly.
Management personnel -- many of whom have provided community leadership -may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to cultural,
charitable, and educational life -- both in terms of leadership and financial support
-- also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.
Five years later Powell had the opportunity to translate these misgivings into an opinion
for the Court that emphasized instead the artificial entity view of the corporation. CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Co. involved a so-called “second generation” anti-takeover statute,
i.e., one that was drafted to get around the problems with the Illinois statute struck down
in MITE.127 The Indiana statute applied only to corporations incorporated in Indiana,
which have specified level of shareholders within the state, and which opt for its
protection. Under the statute, an acquirer who acquired “control shares” in such an
Indiana target could vote them only with the approval of a majority of the pre-existing
disinterested shareholders, to be obtained in a meeting within 50 days after the
acquisition.
The Court of Appeals followed MITE and declared the statute unconstitutional under the
commerce clause, because it interfered with the market for corporate control: “Even if a
corporation’s tangible assets are immovable, the efficiency with which they are employed
and the proportions in which the earnings they generate are divided between management
and shareholders depends on the market for corporate control- an interstate, indeed
international, market that the State of Indiana is not authorized to opt out of.”128
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, stated thatNo principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a
State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to
define the voting rights of shareholders…We think the Court of Appeals failed to
appreciate the significance for Commerce Clause analysis of the fact that state
regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence
and attributes are a product of state law. As Chief Justice Marshall explained: “A
corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
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effect the object for which it was created." Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819).129
Powell thus rejected the view that states do not have the right to regulate transactions
affecting shareholders, including shareholders in other states. He argued that the “free
market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation…is organized under,
and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction…A State has an interest in promoting
stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations it charters.”130 And he
explicitly rejected the market for corporate control and its underlying aggregate theory:
“The Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic
theory…there is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation that may
result from repetitive takeovers will result in more effective management or otherwise be
beneficial to shareholders…the very commodity that is traded in the “market for
corporate control”- the corporation- is one that owes its existence and attributes to state
law.”131
This entire opinion, with its quotation from Dartmouth College, is clearly based on the
artificial entity view that the corporation owes its existence to the incorporating state and
that state may therefore regulate it, including in ways that affect shareholders’ ability to
sell their shares. Not surprisingly, Justice White dissented, arguing that while the statute
may help Indiana corporations “particularly in helping those corporations maintain the
status quo”, it is inimical to the interests of the shareholders and constitutes “economic
protectionism.”132
After CTS, the battle for corporate control moved to state law, and the most important
state in this regard was Delaware, in which most major US corporations are incorporated.
Delaware law was favorable to hostile takeovers until 1989, when the Supreme Court of
Delaware issued an opinion in Paramount v. Time that in practice ended the hostile
takeover boom.133 Paramount had made a $175 (later raised to $200) per share offer for
Time at the time when Time was about to enter into a $70 per share merger with Warner.
Paramount argued that under the previous decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal (1985) and Revlon (1986), Time was “up for sale” and therefore the business
judgment rule was suspended and Time’s board was required to maximize shareholder
value by accepting the much higher Paramount bid.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in favor of Time. It stated thatTwo key predicates underpin our analysis. First, Delaware law imposes on a
board of directors the duty to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
This broad mandate includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. Thus,
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the question of "long-term" versus "short-term" values is largely irrelevant
because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a course for a corporation
which is in its best interest without regard to a fixed investment horizon. Second,
absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of
directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not under any
per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of
a takeover.134
The court thus rejected the view that maximizing short-term shareholder value was
always required; instead, the board was permitted to pursue its view of the best long-term
corporate strategy:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the
stockholders' duly elected board representatives. The fiduciary duty to manage a
corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of
corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders. Directors are
not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term
shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
Thus, the board was permitted to prefer preservation of the “Time culture” (its stated goal
over maximizing the cash return to shareholders). This effectively killed the takeover
threat, because any board could find good long-term share value maximization reasons to
reject a superior cash bid. The Delaware court, in thus enhancing managerial power, in
effect endorsed the real entity view: A corporation was an entity with its own corporate
culture, which should not be subordinated to the shareholders or to the state. This view
was ratified when the ALI corporate governance project adopted a rule that corporate
boards may take into account the interests of other “stakeholders,” not just the
shareholders.135
Why did the real entity view prevail? The obvious answer was that corporate
management determines the state of incorporation, and therefore the Delaware Supreme
Court felt that it had to side with management once the U.S. Supreme Court had
approved the anti-takeover laws of other states, lest corporations choose to relocate there.
However, it seems unlikely that this was the only reason; Delaware is very well
established as the preferred state of incorporation, and stock values would likely decrease
if shareholders perceive that management were leaving Delaware just to protect
themselves. Instead, it seems likely that the Delaware Supreme Court genuinely believed
that a corporation like Time had a corporate existence and culture with implications for
other stakeholders, and therefore rejected the aggregate view equating the corporation
with its shareholders. In that way, its concerns were similar to those raised by Justice
Powell in his concurrence in MITE: A corporation is more than a “nexus of contracts”,
and courts and legislatures are allowed to take the interests of other stakeholders into
account.
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5.
Fourth Transformation: From National Corporations to Multinational
Enterprises.
The last transformation in the nature of the corporation began in the 1950s and is still
going on, so that its ultimate outcome is hard to judge. This is the transformation from
corporations based mostly in one country to multinational enterprises based in many
countries.
Multinationals, in the sense of corporations owning assets overseas, have existed since
the 17th century. However, as recently as the 1950s, the shareholders and other sources of
capital, the management, most of the production facilities, and most of the markets of
even large multinationals tended to be in one country, so that “what was good for G.M.
was good for America.” By the 1990s, however, this has changed profoundly. As more
countries opened up to foreign direct investment, communications improved, and many
products became lighter and easier to ship, more and more corporations became
“globalized.” In a globalized multinational, the sources of capital are in many countries:
The shares of large multinationals trade on as many as twenty exchanges, and borrowing
facilities are similarly diversified. Research and development and production facilities are
likewise spread throughout the globe, as are markets. The only thing that usually ties a
modern multinational to its home country is the location of management.
In this context, the debate over the nature of the corporation has re-opened. There is
abundant academic writing on the relationship between multinationals and the state, and
most writers from both left and right concede that this relationship has changed
profoundly so that the home state (the state of incorporation) has become powerless to
control “its” multinationals; it is hard even to identify to which country multinationals
“belong”.136 On a practical level this situation has led to attempts by home states to
control the behavior of multinationals abroad in areas as diverse as trading with the
enemy, antitrust, corruption and others, with varying success.137 The most recent
development in this regard has been “inversion” transactions, in which the management
changes the country of incorporation of a multinational’s parent corporation. These
transactions are undertaken primarily for tax reasons, but they have corporate governance
implications as well.138 Specifically, the artificial entity theory becomes hard to maintain
when management can pick weak countries like Bermuda as the country of incorporation
for the parent of a multinational.
The relationship with shareholders has also undergone changes as shareholders now tend
to come from many countries. One implication of this has been that the securities laws of
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the weakest country tend to dominate because of cross-country price arbitrage.139 Another
is academic proposals to let management choose the country of securities law as well as
the country of incorporation.140 On a practical level globalization has led the SEC to relax
requirements for some foreign issuers.141 This trend has tended to weaken the
applicability of the aggregate view as well. It is hard to predict where these trends will
lead, but at the moment they appear once more to favor the real entity view.
To summarize: Throughout all the transformations we have studied, the same pattern
recurs. As the relationship of the corporation to the state, to society and to its members or
shareholders changes, all three views of the corporation emerge, submerge and then reemerge in a slightly different but fundamentally similar form. In the end, however, the
real entity view prevails.
Why does the real entity view prevail? In part, this is no doubt due to the fact that it
represents the most congenial view to corporate management, because it shields them
from undue interference from both shareholders and the state. Corporate management
wields political power and it influences the outcome of the debate; judges again and again
refer to the importance of corporations, by which they mean corporate management. But
the very fact that corporate management wields this power shows that there is another
reason why the real entity view prevails: It fits reality much more than the other two. In
some periods (e.g., the Roman Empire or 18th century Europe) the power of the state is
overwhelming and the artificial entity view seems plausible, and in other periods (the
medieval membership corporation, the 19th century close corporation) the aggregate view
seems plausible, but in most periods equating the corporation either with the state or with
shareholders must have seemed to most non-academics highly implausible. The real
entity view prevailed because it was more real than the others. And this observation
enables us to move from the historical to the normative part of the discussion and ask
what implications does the reality of managerial power have for corporate law and
regulation.
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III. Normative Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility.
What are the implications of these cyclical transformations of corporate theory for the
problem of CSR? Can we draw any conclusions on the legitimacy of CSR from the
history described above? I would argue that the answer is yes, and that the dominance of
real entity theory for most of corporate history has far reaching implications for the
legitimacy of CSR activities, for the reasons explained below.
a. The Three Theories and CSR.
Each of the three theories of the corporation permits a different level of CSR, as indicated
in the following table:
Table 1: Theories of the Corporation and CSR
Theory
Type of CSR

Aggregate

Artificial

Real

For long-run benefit
of shareholders

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Not for shareholders,
Corporation responsible

Not for shareholders,
Corporation not responsible No

The first type of CSR involves activities that can clearly and demonstrably benefit
shareholders in the long run. For example, actions that prevent environmental disasters or
comply with legal and ethical rules can have a significant positive effect in preventing
disastrous corporate calamities, even if they cost money in the short run. Thus, even
proponents of the aggregate theory, the currently dominant theory of the corporation in
academic circles, would support this type of CSR.
The second type of CSR involves activities that are designed to mitigate social harms the
corporation was responsible for, even when there is no direct legal responsibility, and
when no benefit to the shareholders can be shown. Under the aggregate theory, such
activities should not be permitted because they do not benefit shareholders. But under the
artificial entity theory, since it emphasizes the benefits of corporate existence derived
from the state, an implicit contract can be inferred that the corporation will help the state
in mitigating harms that it causes even in the absence of legal responsibility. Otherwise,
the state will have to bear this burden imposed by the corporation it created.
Finally, the third type of CSR involves activities like AIDS prevention, for which the
corporation is not responsible and which in most cases do not benefit its shareholders,
even in the long run. This type of CSR would not be required or even permitted under the
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aggregate or artificial entity theories. But under the real entity theory, since the
corporation is regarded as a person just like individuals, it is permitted to act
philanthropically just like individuals are, and should in fact be praised to the extent it
does so.142
Thus, under the real theory, even CSR activities that have nothing to do with benefiting
shareholders or with direct corporate responsibility are permitted. This still requires an
answer to the two arguments advanced by Levitt, Friedman, Jensen and their
colleagues.143
First, the argument that the money being spent on CSR belongs to the shareholders and
therefore management have no right to spend it according to their preferences in ways
that are not related to maximizing shareholder value. However, as long as the
corporation’s CSR activities are adequately disclosed to the shareholders (and the
securities laws are designed to assure such disclosure is made), it is not clear that they
have a right to complain. If the shareholders do not like the firm engaging in CSR
activities, they can sell the shares and invest solely in firms that do not engage in such
activities. Even in today’s world, it is unlikely that shareholders will find it difficult to
eschew firms that engage in CSR, although most large publicly traded firms do so.
Moreover, it can be argued that the majority of current shareholders, namely those who
invest through mutual funds and pension funds, invest primarily to obtain a secure return
and not for maximum but risky gains. In this sense, most shareholders today are more
like bondholders or preferred shareholders, who care more about a stable return than
about value maximization. For those shareholders, firms that promise a secure,
reasonably high return are a good investment, even if they reduce the chances of
obtaining returns over that limit by engaging in CSR. Those shareholders who seek to
maximize returns are then free to invest in firms that do not engage in CSR.
Second, the argument that if firms are free to engage in CSR, it will be more difficult to
evaluate management performance since there will be no single benchmark like earnings
per share. This may be true, but in a complex world, we are used to evaluating leaders on
more than one benchmark. We would not seriously argue that political leaders, for
example, must be evaluated only on their economic performance and on no other
measure. If we can use complex measures to evaluate politicians, we can do the same for
CEO’s.
Finally, as Chen and Hanson point out, there is an internal inconsistency in Milton
Friedman’s argument, because if markets are efficient they should prevent managers from
engaging in actions that are not in the best interest of shareholders.144 Friedman may in
fact have believed that to be the case, but the dominance of the real entity view of the
corporation through 2,000 years of corporate history suggests that management usually
find a way to do as they wish, including engaging in CSR when it may not be in the long142
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term interest of shareholders. Since the courts are unable to effectively police such
behavior and markets are an inefficient constraint, it is unclear what in practice is gained
by arguing in favor of shareholder primacy and against CSR.
Thus, if the historical argument advanced above is correct, and real entity theory is in fact
the dominant theory of the corporation for most of its history, this can justify CSR to a
much greater extent than is commonly accepted by most corporate law academics. Why,
then, has the aggregate theory achieved such success in US academic circles? The answer
requires a comparative perspective.
b. The Three Theories and Varieties of Capitalism: A Comparative Perspective.
Political economists distinguish among three types of advanced capitalist societies. Under
the “varieties of capitalism” framework, economies can be differentiated by their
comparative institutional advantages. In general, economies can be characterized as either
liberal (market economies, such as the UK), corporatist (organized market economies that
rely on tightly integrated private and networked associations to resolve significant
dilemmas of economic integration, such as Germany), or statist (depending on
hierarchical solutions in resolving coordination problems, such as France).145
The varieties of capitalism framework suggest that firms in each of the three models of
economic governance will distinguish themselves in different fields. In liberal market
economies, the advantages of a flexible regulatory structure benefits industries targeting
low costs and those operating in sectors characterized by radical innovation (e.g.,
software, bio technology). In corporatist economies, high levels of business coordination
benefit sectors that rely on long-term contracts, and firms specialize in high quality, scale
intensive and specialized supplier industries (autos, machine tools, chemicals). Statist
economies favor large scale-intensive industries that have long time horizons or require
major capital investment (autos, transport).146
There is an obvious correlation between the three varieties of capitalism described by
political economists and the three historical theories of the firm outlined above. The
liberal model of the UK and the US, with its emphasis on arm’s length relationships and
public trading, best first the aggregate theory of the firm. The statist, hierarchical model
of France, with its emphasis on the relationship between the firm and the state, best fits
the artificial entity model. And the German and Japanese style corporatist model best fits
the real entity theory.
This relationship can also explain why in Europe CSR is much less controversial than in
the US. Practically every EU government (including even the UK) has programs
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designed to foster CSR.147 These kind of programs are hard to imagine in the US context
given the widespread hostility to CSR.
Fundamentally, therefore, the debate around CSR is linked to another wide-spread debate
in corporate law: Whether corporate law is destined to “converge” on the US model of
publicly traded corporations with dispersed share ownership, or whether other models
(such as the German and Japanese models) are viable. The aggregate, nexus of contracts
theory is closely linked to the US corporate governance model, while other models are
much more open to CSR. Recent literature has given rise to doubts about the convergence
hypothesis, but this debate will no doubt continue.148
The purpose of this article has been to show, however, that even in the US context the
aggregate theory has not always been dominant. In fact, throughout most of the history
described above, the real theory was the dominant one, and it can be argued that in
practice most corporations are still operating on the basis of the real theory, not the
aggregate one. Thus, CSR, which as we have seen is most easy to justify in all its forms
on the basis of the real theory of the corporation, is likely to remain practiced for the
future. The debate on CSR should therefore shift from whether CSR is acceptable to how
to make it more accountable and effective in obtaining socials goals- but that is an issue
for another day.149
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